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Because representation necessarily mediates between a subject — in the case of the 
Shoah, a subject of acute moral magnitude — and its reader, there is inevitably a moral peril 
involved in its artistic rendering.  Representation after all requires a medium, medium implies the 
imposition of form, form raises the question of literary language as the means of representation.  
The writer in the aftermath of the Shoah was confronted with an irresolvable aporetic situation: 
there was a moral obligation to bear witness to the heinous crimes, yet the writer was constantly 
threatened with speechlessness due to the constraints which this event of unimaginable 
magnitude imposed upon conventional language.  As a formidable challenge to human 
comprehension and conceptualisation, the Shoah presented, by extension, an onerous challenge to 
articulation.  Those writing in the German tongue faced yet another formidable barrier — the 
medium itself had become compromised.  Having lain at the core of a decadent ideology the 
conventional German language had been manipulated and distorted under the National Socialist 
regime and had adopted perverse and sinister meanings and associations.  The writer was thus 
forced to express a horror of unimaginable magnitude by means of an impaired and 
misappropriated linguistic medium, which seemed to be completely incommensurate with its 
subject of representation.  Added to this of course was the question of the legitimacy of the 
artistic rendering of the suffering of millions.  The crisis of aesthetics thus acquired an ethical 
dimension.  The moral and aesthetic justification for the very act of writing itself was 
fundamentally called into question. The issue was thus not only how the Shoah could be 
represented but whether its appropriation in literary form was legitimate at all.  
It is difficult to think of another area of literary discourse in which a critic has brought 
such a profound influence to bear, as Theodor W. Adorno has, in the area of literature concerning 
the Shoah. It is also difficult to think of another area of literary discourse in which a critic’s 
pronouncements have been misinterpreted so often and to such a degree as have Adorno’s 
reflections concerning the status of art after the Shoah.  Reference here is of course being made to 
Adorno’s (supposed) ‘dictum’ concerning the barbarity of poetry after Auschwitz.  The principle 




dialectical tension conferred on them in the original text.  I will examine what I have termed the 
“after-Auschwitz” aporia, so evident in Adorno’s reflections on post-Shoah art and yet 
overlooked all too frequently in the research literature.  Defined as an irresolvable impasse as a 
result of equally plausible yet inconsistent premises the term “aporia” succinctly captures the 
essence of Adorno’s deliberations on post-Shoah art: the imperative to represent the egregious 
crimes and the impossibility of doing so.  I will demonstrate that Adorno’s pronouncements were 
never meant as silence-inducing taboos, but rather as concrete theoretical reflections upon the 
moral status of art in the aftermath of the Shoah and as warnings of the moral peril involved in 
the artistic rendering of mass extermination. 
There is hardly a single contribution to the debate surrounding the representation of the 
Shoah that does not draw, to some degree or other, upon Adorno’s thought; and rightly so:  his 
extensive reflections on the status of art after the event are after all crucial to any consideration of 
the representation of the event.  The problem, however, is that time and time again his complex 
deliberations have been and indeed continue to be reduced to a single sentence: “Nach Auschwitz 
ein Gedicht zu schreiben ist barbarisch” [It is barbaric to write poetry after Auschwitz].1 These 
eight words have come to be known as Adorno’s ‘dictum’; a dictum, which has supposedly 
denounced all art after Auschwitz as invalid.  To cite but a very brief number of misquotations 
and misinterpretations; Susan Gubar makes reference to “Adorno’s injunction against poetry” and 
to the “nihilism of his prohibition against poetry” (240, my emphasis). Günther Bohnheim 
(promoting an argument in direct contrast to the latter critic) goes so far as to entitle his 
monograph Versuch zu zeigen, daß Adorno mit seiner Behauptung, nach Auschwitz lasse sich 
kein Gedicht mehr schreiben, recht hätte.  [The attempt to show that Adorno’s claim, that after 
Auschwitz poetry cannot be written, is correct].  One of the most recent contributions to the 
debate by Elrud Ibsch again misreads Adorno’s words as a call for silence: “Adorno mußte 
widersprochen werden.  Das Verstummen der Poesie wäre der Triumph der NS-Barberei noch 
über ihr politisches Ende hinaus“ (48, my emphasis).  [Adorno must be contradicted.  The 
silencing of poetry would mean the triumph of the National Socialist barbarity].  When examined 
within context, however, it becomes rapidly clear that Adorno did not cancel the possibility of art 
after Auschwitz but rather highlighted the aporetic situation in which the post-Shoah writer found 
                                                 




himself; an aporia so extreme that it leaves no space for meaningful resolution.  The basic context 
of the sentence, overlooked time and time again in the research literature is as follows:  
Je totaler die Gesellschaft, um so verdinglichter auch der Geist und um so paradoxer sein 
Beginnen, der Verdinglichung aus Eigenem sich zu entwinden.  Noch das äußerste 
Bewußtsein vom Verhängnis droht zum Geschwätz zu entarten. Kulturkritik findet sich 
der letzten Stufe der Dialektik von Kultur und Barberei gegenüber: nach Auschwitz ein 
Gedicht zu schreiben, ist barbarisch, und das frißt auch die Erkenntnis an, die ausspricht, 
warum es unmöglich ward, heute Gedichte zu schreiben” (Adorno „Kulturkritik I“ 30). 
[The more total the society the greater the reification of the mind and the more 
paradoxical its attempt to escape reification on its own.  Even the most extreme 
consciousness of doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter. Cultural criticism finds 
itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism.  To write poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric, and this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become 
impossible to write poetry today]. 
For Adorno, the barbarism of poetry after Auschwitz stems from the fact that it will fail to 
produce the knowledge of its own impossibility due to absolute reification.  All-encompassing 
instrumental rationality fused with irrational ends, technological domination and the reduction of 
all thought to the calculation of the efficiency of means - these Enlightenment and capitalist 
tendencies (for Adorno, as a member of the Frankfurt School, the perilous legacies of modernity) 
had their apotheosis in the Nazi death camps.   Absolute reification has halted the process of self-
reflection.  As a form of supposedly free and individual expression it is irreconcilable with the 
fact that fascism not only integrated the individual, but along with it those cultural spheres 
presumed to be autonomous. In the concentration camps human life had been rendered indifferent 
and by extension expendable. This freedom of individual expression is thus but a façade and a 
denial of the fact that the death camps brought an end to the very idea of the autonomous subject. 
The annihilation of the very concept of the individual is of absolute centrality to Adorno’s line of 
thought: 
“Der Völkermord ist die absolute Integration, die überall sich vorbereitet, wo Menschen 
gleichgemacht werden, geschliffen, wie man beim Militär es nannte, bis man sie, 
Abweichungen vom Begriff ihrer vollkommen Nichtigkeit, buchstäblich austilgt. [...] Was 




Schornstein in den Himmel dich schlängeln, nennt die Gleichgültigkeit des Lebens jedes 
Einzelnen, [...] schon in seiner formalen Freiheit ist er so fungibel und ersetzbar wie dann 
unter den Tritten der Liquidatoren. [...] daraus führt so wenig hinaus wie aus der 
elektrisch geladenen Stacheldrahtumfriedung der Lager“ („Negative Dialektik“ 353). 
[Genocide is the absolute integration.  It is on its way wherever men are “polished off”, as 
they called it in the military and literally exterminated as deviations from the concept of 
their absolute nullity.  What the sadists in the concentration camps said to the inmates: 
tomorrow you will be trailing skyward in the form of smoke from this chimney, reveals 
the indifference towards the life of the individual. Even in his formal freedom he is just as 
fungible and replaceable as he is under the boots of the liquidator. He can escape this no 
more than he can escape the barbed wire enclosure of the camp]. 
For Adorno the Shoah was the obliteration of the very concept of the autonomous subject. His 
reflections in this regard are fundamental to his deliberations concerning the status of art in the 
wake of the Shoah.  To return to artistic subjectivism would be completely inappropriate given 
that the Shoah had rendered the very idea of individuality completely void: “Die 
Undarstellbarkeit des Faschismus aber rührt daher, daß es in ihm so wenig in seiner Betrachtung 
Freiheit des Subjekts mehr gibt.  Vollendete Unfreiheit läßt sich erkennen, nicht darstellen” 
(Adorno “Minima Moralia” 148).  [The impossibility of portraying Fascism stems from the fact 
that in it subjective freedom no longer exists.  Absolute lack of freedom cannot be represented].  
It was precisely the individual consciousness that was denied in the death camps and the 
imposition of agency in the process of representation would inevitably lead to a distortion.  In the 
camps the victims were robbed not only of freedom and individual choice, they had also been 
denied that ultimate aspect of human dignity, namely individual death; the Shoah was, to use the 
words of DeKoven Ezrahi, “the unceremonious mass production of death” (83); this must be 
reflected in the representation, failure to do so will result in a breach between the artwork and the 
subject of representation.   It is in this regard that certain genres within figurative discourse have 
intrinsic difficulties when it comes to the representation of the Shoah, to cite but one example — 
the dramatic genre.  The basic premise upon which drama rests  human agency, individual 
motivation, the choice of one course of action over another  simply cannot be met.  Drama 
depends on the freedom of its individual characters to choose, to opt for various courses of 




inmates.  Tragedy, as one of the main dramatic genres is particularly problematic.  As Howe 
writes: “In classical tragedy man is defeated, in the Holocaust man is destroyed” (Howe 190).  In 
tragedy this defeat is usually associated with a certain sense of grandeur, this is of course 
completely inappropriate when the subject of representation is systematic mass murder; there is 
no grandeur here.  Given these insurmountable barriers it is not surprising that drama has yielded 
fewer individual works about the Shoah than the other major literary forms (Lang 131).  
Adorno’s pronouncement must also be examined within the context of his thoughts on 
culture in the wake of the Shoah.  His writings in this regard are simply indispensable for a 
contextualisation of his pronouncement:  
“Auschwitz [hat] das Mißlingen der Kultur unwiderleglich bewiesen.  Daß es geschehen 
konnte inmitten aller Tradition der Philosophie, der Kunst und der aufklärenden 
Wissenschaften, sagt mehr als nur, daß diese, der Geist, es nicht vermochte, die Menschen 
zu ergreifen und zu verändern. [...] Alle Kultur nach Auschwitz, samt der dringlichen 
Kritik daran, ist Müll“ (“Negative Dialektik“ 360). [Auschwitz has demonstrated 
irrefutably that culture has failed.  That it could happen in the midst of the philosophical 
traditions, the arts and the enlightening sciences says more than just that these failed to 
take hold of and change the people. All culture after Auschwitz, including its urgent 
critique, is rubbish].   
Adorno is addressing the question of what ‘culture’ could possibly mean after the absolute failure 
of culture.  The Shoah, a systematic, mechanical annihilation of a specific group ‘selected’ on the 
basis of alleged biological traits and perversely organised with bureaucratic efficiency, was “a 
mockery of the very idea of culture which had survived into the twentieth century” (DeKoven 
Ezrahi 1).  What credibility could cultural and artistic discourse possibly have, having themselves 
emanated from the very same ‘culture’ from which Auschwitz had sprung; as Steiner writes:  
“We now know that a man can read Goethe or Rilke in the evening, that he can play Bach and 
Schubert, and go to his day’s work at Auschwitz in the morning” (ix).  The fact that the heinous 
mass murder of millions had been carried out within the framework of a society at the peak of 
cultural and artistic achievement meant that the legitimacy of artistic discourse, after this 
‘culture’ had gone so catastrophically awry, was suddenly called into question.  Adorno argues 




in an otherwise progressive culture.  Auschwitz, rather was part and parcel of the civilising 
process itself: 
“Millionen schuldloser Menschen — die Zahlen zu nennen oder darüber zu feilschen, ist 
bereits menschenunwürdig — wurden planvoll ermordert.  Das ist von keinem 
Lebendigen als Oberflächenphänomen, als Abirrung vom Lauf der Geschichte abzutun, 
die gegenüber der großen Tendenzen des Fortschritts, der Aufklärung, der vermeintlich 
zunehmenden Humanität nicht in Betracht käme“ („Erziehung nach Auschwitz“ 49). 
[Millions of innocent people — to wrangle over the figure is in itself inhumane — have 
been systematically murdered, this was no superficial phenomenon, it is not to be seen as 
an aberration from the otherwise progressive tendencies of progress and Enlightenment 
and supposed steady perfection of humanity].  
The fact that centuries of Enlightemnent culture failed to predict and prevent the forces of 
fascism is an implacable indictment of that culture.  Adorno was writing against the tide of a 
complacent restorative mindset in post-War Germany. He writes with a note of sarcasm: “Der 
Gedanke, daß nach diesem Krieg das Leben „normal“ weitergehen oder gar die Kultur 
„wiederaufgebaut“ werden könnte — als wäre nicht der Wiederaufbau von Kultur allein schon 
deren Negation, — ist idiotisch.  Millionen Juden sind ermordert worden, und das soll ein 
Zwischenspiel sein und nicht die Katastrophe selbst?  Worauf wartet diese Kultur eigentlich 
noch?“ (Minima Moralia 64). [The idea that after this war life could go on as normal, that culture 
can be resurrected — as if the resurrection of culture would not itself be its own negation — is 
idiotic.  Millions of Jews have been murdered and this should be an interlude and not the actual 
catastrophe? What exactly is this culture awaiting?].  Adorno criticises the prevailing self-
satisfied idea among the German people of having come to terms with their recent past.  That 
which took place was not a critical analysis of the way the majority of the German people 
accepted and indeed willingly participated in the demonic regime but rather a process of wilful 
forgetting; an attempt to normalise the past in an effort to legitimise West German democracy 
and its “economic miracle”.  Adorno is at pains to reiterate that all cannot simply be made good 
again; his derides the hollow and complacent restorative tendencies in post-war German society.   
The sentence, which concludes the passage quoted above takes on absolutely crucial 
significance in the light of so many misinterpretations of his earlier pronouncement and reveals 




“Wer für Erhaltung der radikal schuldigen und schäbigen Kultur plädiert, macht sich zum 
Helfershelfer, während, wer der Kultur sich verweigert, unmittelbar die Barberei fördert, 
als welche die Kultur sich erhüllte. Nicht einmal Schweigen kommt aus dem Zirkul 
heraus; es rationalisiert einzig die eigene subjektive Unfähigkeit mit dem Stand der 
objektiven Wahrheit und entwürdigt dadurch diese abermals zur Lüge“ (Negative 
Dialektik 360, my emphasis). [Whoever calls for the resurrection of this guilty and 
shabby culture becomes its accomplice, while whoever denies culture directly promotes 
the barbarism which culture revealed itself to be. Not even silence gets us out of this 
circle, since in silence we simply use the state of objective truth to rationalise our 
subjective inability, thereby once again degrading truth into a lie].   
The aporia facing the post-Shoah writer comes explicitly to the fore: those who call for the 
resurrection of this culpable ‘culture’ become inextricably implicated while those who deny 
culture are also reprehensible.  Adorno was not, however, calling for an end to art after 
Auschwitz, and nowhere is this stated more overtly than in this passage, nor does the dialectical 
tension come more explicitly to the fore than at this juncture; the incapacity to represent the 
events cannot be used as grounds for the abandonment of art.  To remain silent, and to rationalise 
this on the basis of the recognition of subjective inability to represent the horror, is but a self-
complacent delusion: the idea of so much as recognising one’s inability is a lie in itself because 
Auschwitz has literally liquidated the very idea of the autonomous subject.  This self-complacent 
(delusory) recognition of subjective inability is also a detraction from the impossible but 
nonetheless crucial necessity of reflection on the horror itself: the dialectical tension can be 
summed up as follows: we cannot truly reflect upon our incapacity, we must reflect upon it, the 
horror cannot be reflected upon to any meaningful degree, it must be reflected upon; the horror 
cannot be represented, it must be represented.  In this passage Adorno succinctly presents a 
paradigmatic case of extreme aporia, which leaves no room for resolution.  
Adorno reflected deeply upon the moral peril involved in the artistic rendering of the 
suffering of the victims; the first problem was the poison lying at the core of the German 
language itself: “Kein vom Hohen getöntes Wort, auch kein Theologisches, hat unverwandelt 
nach Auschwitz ein Recht” (“Negative Dialektik” 360).  [No word tinged from on high, not even 
a theological one has the right to exist after Auschwitz unless it has undergone a transformation].  




abuse and misappropriation under the National Socialist regime; as Steiner writes: “Use a 
language to conceive, organise and justify Belsen; use it to make out specifications for gas ovens; 
[…] Something will happen to it.  […]  Something will happen to the words.  Something of the 
lies and sadism will settle in the marrow of the language (101).  The German language had lay at 
the core of a perverted ideology, at the heart of which was to provide Lebensraum [Living space] 
for those worthy of life while Unwertes Leben [Those unworthy of life] were targeted for 
extermination.  The language at the core of this perverted ideology had been, as Bauman writes 
“fraught with images of disease, infection, infestation, putrefaction and pestilence”.  The Jews 
had been spoken of as “bacilli, decomposing germs, or vermin” (71).  The German language had 
been used to shroud the most barbaric crimes in equally barbaric euphemisms: ‘Endlösung’, 
[Final Solution] ‘Umsiedlung’, [resettlement] ‘Selektion’, [selection] ‘Sonderbehandlung’, 
[special treatment] for example had been used to euphemise crimes of unimaginable magnitude.  
To cleanse a language after such abuse was seen by Adorno as a nigh impossible task.  The 
second danger was the potential of every artwork to give pleasure and to diminish the horror of 
the event: 
Das Übermaß an realem Leiden duldet kein Vergessen. [...]. Aber jenes Leiden [...] 
erheischt auch die Fortdauer von Kunst, die es verbietet;  kaum wo anders findet das 
Leiden noch seine eigene Stimme, den Trost, der es nicht sogleich verriete. [...] Aber 
indem es trotz aller Härte und Unversöhnlichkeit zum Bild gemacht wird, ist es doch, als 
ob die Scham vor den Opfern verletzt wäre.  Aus diesen wird etwas bereitet, Kunstwerke, 
der Welt zum Fraß vorgeworfen, die sie umbrachte.  Die sogennante künstlerische 
Gestaltung des nackten körperlichen Schmerzes, der mit Gewehrkölben 
Niedergeknüppelten, enthält, sei’s noch so entfernt, das Potential Genuss 
herauszupressen. [...] Durchs ästhetische Stilisationsprinzip [...] erscheint das 
unausdenkliche Schicksal doch, als hätte es irgend Sinn gehabt; es wird verklärt, etwas 
von dem Grauen weggenommen, damit allein widerfährt den Opfern Unrecht [...] 
(Adorno “Noten” 125 my emphasis).  [Extreme suffering tolerates no forgetting.  This 
suffering demands the continued existence of the very art it forbids.   It is in art alone that 
suffering can be voiced without being immediately betrayed by it.  However, by 
transforming this suffering, despite all attempts at irreconcilability and severity, into an 




artistic rendering of the naked physical pain of those beaten down with rifle butts 
contains, the potential, however remote, that pleasure can be squeezed from it.  By means 
of the principle of aesthetic stylisation the unimaginable fate of the victims appears as 
having had some kind of sense, it becomes transfigured, the horror is softened and this 
alone does a great injustice to the victims]. 
Adorno holds deep reservations concerning the possibilities of this forbidden and at the same 
time obligatory art.  To derive any form of aesthetic pleasure from the victim’s experience was 
for Adorno a complete distortion of that same experience.  Not only would representation in 
aesthetic form as a matter of course shear away some of the horror, but the principle of aesthetic 
stylisation might attribute a sense of meaning to the fate of the victims in the sense that senseless 
mass murder would be given meaningful form.  Adorno feared that by means of this ‘principle of 
aesthetic stylisation’ the suffering of the victims would be transfigured into an aesthetically 
rounded narrative, thereby not just attributing sense to a senseless massacre but also downplaying 
the horror of the event.  This aesthetic principle of form was what particularly concerned Adorno: 
“Wo vom Äußersten, dem quallvollen Tod die Rede ist, schämt man sich der Form, so, als ob sie 
an dem Leiden frevelte, indem sie es unausweichlich zu einem Material macht, über das sie sich 
verfügt” (“Negative Dialektik“ 597). [Where the subject is agonizing death, form is shameful, as 
though it sins against the suffering, which it inevitably reduces to a material that can be disposed 
of].  The transformation of the events of the Shoah into meaningful form leads to a falsification of 
events. Representing the horror within an ordered and coherent formal structure runs the risk of 
attributing a sense of meaning to the senseless massacre.  Adorno writes: “Das ästhetische 
Prinzip der Form ist an sich, durch Synthesis des Geformten, Setzung von Sinn, noch wo Sinn 
inhaltlich verworfen wird“ (“Ästhetische Theorie” 403). [The aesthetic principle of form always 
means the attribution of meaning, even when meaning is rejected in content].  Moreover, formal 
coherence offers the potential for aesthetic pleasure, which in the case of physical annihilation is 
completely inappropriate.  It is, however, again explicitly clear that Adorno was not calling for 
silence in the light of these insurmountable barriers; the dialectical tension of his thought comes 
yet again to the fore: the suffering of the victims demands the continued existence of that art, 
which it simultaneously forbids. 
 Adorno’s own qualifications of his original pronouncement assume critical 




qualifications have in turn either been ignored or decontextualized.  The one most commonly 
cited is that which has come to be known as Adorno’s “Widerruf”; the alleged ‘retraction’ of his 
original pronouncement.  Aside from the fact that to read the passage in question as a retraction is 
to argue that he ‘retracted’ something he had never actually stated to begin with, nowhere in this 
passage does he come even close to recanting his original pronouncement; quite the opposite.  
His supposed ‘retraction’ is to be found in the following passage: “Das perennierende Leiden hat 
soviel Recht auf Ausdruck wie der Gemarterte zu brüllen, darum mag falsch gewesen sein, nach 
Auschwitz ließe sich kein Gedicht mehr schreiben” (“Negative Dialektik” 355).  [Perennial 
suffering has as much right to expression as the tortured person has to scream; thus it may have 
been wrong to say that after Auschwitz poetry can no longer be written].  When read in isolation 
like this alongside the decontextualized original pronouncement, then it does indeed appear to be 
a retraction.  However, the sentence, which immediately follows quite simply invalidates any 
such interpretation:  
Nicht falsch ist aber die minder kulturelle Frage, ob nach Auschwitz noch sich leben 
lasse, ob vollends es dürfe, wer zufällig entrann und hätte umgebracht werden müssen. 
[...], drastische Schuld des Verschonten.   Zur Vergeltung suchen ihn Träume heim wie 
der, daß er gar nicht mehr lebte, sondern 1944 vergast worden wäre (“Negative Dialektik” 
354).  [Not wrong is, however, the less cultural question, whether after Auschwitz living 
is possible at all; whether it’s at all permissible to him who by chance escaped but should 
have been murdered; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared.  As revenge he is 
plagued by dreams that he no longer lives but rather was gassed in 1944]. 
Any argument, which claims that Adorno retracted his original pronouncement, can be 
immediately refuted in the light of this qualifying sentence.  Adorno was not just questioning the 
possibility of art in the wake of the Shoah but rather questioning existence itself, thereby not 
retracting his original words but rather superseding; the spheres of art and culture are subsumed 
under the all-consuming notion of existence.  Far from retracting his statement he widens the 
scope of his reflections from art after Auschwitz to the right to existence itself.  The verb 
“dürfen” in the original German text denotes permission; Adorno is not writing about a physical 
ability to live on but rather raises the issue to moral grounds.  He broadens the scope of his 
deliberations to the question of survivor’s guilt to demonstrate that any notions of simply moving 




camps had done so merely per chance.  In the death camps, after all, it had merely been a 
perverse question of statistics; survival for one had been secured at the cost of the life of another. 
Adorno writes: “Die Schuld des Lebens, das als pures Faktum bereits anderem Leben den Atem 
raubt, einer Statistik gemäß, die eine überwältigende Zahl Ermorderter durch eine minimale 
Geretteter ergänzt, (...) ist mit dem Leben nicht mehr zu versöhnen (“Negative Dialektik” 357).  
[The guilt of a life, which is secured at the cost of another, where, statistically speaking there is 
minimal number, rescued at the cost of an overwhelming number murdered; this guilt is 
irreconcilable with living].  Another passage which assumes critical significance is one in which 
Adorno makes explicit reference to his earlier pronouncement: “Während die Situation Kunst 
nicht mehr zuläßt—darauf zielte der Satz über die Unmöglichkeit von Gedichten nach 
Auschwitz—bedarf sie doch ihrer (Ästhetische Theorie 374).  [While the situation does not 
permit art—this is what was meant by the sentence concerning the impossibility of art after 
Auschwitz—it nonetheless demands it].  Yet again Adorno makes the dialectical tension of his 
argument explicitly clear: post-Shoah art is not permissible but simultaneously indispensable. 
In this paper I have attempted to restore Adorno’s pronouncements to their argumentative 
context.  Adorno called neither for silence nor for an end to art.  Rather he calls for a form of art, 
which bears witness to its predestined failure, artworks which present the fact that the 
“unrepresentable” exists.  Adorno’s dialectic emphasises the indispensability of that which it 
simultaneously deems impossible, it demands the pursuit of that which it deems inevitably futile.  
The recognition of the impossibility of art after Auschwitz is constantly tied to an insistence on 
its indispensability.  Adorno’s reflections are not to be seen merely as operating on an abstract 
level of theoretical thought; rather his writings can be seen as concrete reflections on the 
possibilities and limitations of post-Shoah art.  He does not simply bemoan the failure of culture; 
rather, while making abundantly clear that culture’s complicity is irrefragable and acutely aware 
of the onus which Auschwitz has placed on language, he simultaneously emphasises the 
obligation to utterance rather than an insistence upon silence.  It is exclusively within the aporetic 
and dialectical matrix, which has been highlighted in this paper, that Adorno’s deliberations on 
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